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A B S T R A C T
Empirical success is a central criterion for scientific decision-making. Yet its understanding in philosophical
studies of science deserves renewed attention: Should philosophers think differently about the advancement
of science when they deal with the uncertainty of outcome in ongoing research in comparison with historical
episodes? This paper argues that normative appeals to empirical success in the evaluation of competing scien-
tific explanations can result in unreliable conclusions, especially when we are looking at the changeability of
direction in unsettled investigations. The challenges we encounter arise from the inherent dynamics of disci-
plinary and experimental objectives in research practice. In this paper we discuss how these dynamics inform
the evaluation of empirical success by analyzing three of its requirements: data accommodation, instrumen-
tal reliability, and predictive power. We conclude that the assessment of empirical success in developing in-
quiry is set against the background of a model's interactive success and prospective value in an experimental
context. Our argument is exemplified by the analysis of an apparent controversy surrounding the model of a
quantum nose in research on olfaction. Notably, the public narrative of this controversy rests on a distorted
perspective on measures of empirical success.
© 2017.
1. Introduction
Empirical success is a central criterion for scientific decision-mak-
ing. Competing models and methods are considered pursuit-worthy
if they produce tangible and quantifiable results. In this context, em-
pirical success is seen as a necessary if insufficient condition for the
truth or, at least, the adequacy of scientific explanations. Advocates
of both scientific realism and anti-realism have centered on empirical
success as a criterion of the progressiveness of models (Van Fraassen,
1980; Psillos, 1999). Generally these accounts define empirical suc-
cess by the requirements to fit the experimental data, be instrumentally
reliable, and represent a good predictor of new phenomena (Doppelt,
2005).
Yet philosophers have also recognized many issues that underlie
the epistemic value of empirical success for the assessment of sci-
entific explanations. Empirical success admits of degrees, and a cen-
tral challenge facing its explication is the difficulty of justifying the
primacy of support from multiple methods or incommensurable mod-
els. A well-known problem in the history of science is that many suc-
cessful theories in fact turned out to be false, resulting in the classic
argument of pessimistic meta-induction (Laudan, 1981). Inevitably,
this furthers the question of how stable and durable the criterion of
empirical success really is for attributions of adequacy to rival scien-
tific explanations. Given the frequency of appeals to empirical suc
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cess, especially in rational accounts of theory choice (Solomon, 2001),
the notion itself thus deserves renewed attention.
This paper focuses on potential challenges to the philosophical un-
derstanding of empirical success when we assess the appraisal of cur-
rent, as in unresolved, research strategies. Almost all of the central
ideas in the philosophy of science have been developed and tested
against the background of concluded case studies, routinely also in-
volving discussions about their historical accuracy (Schickore, 2011).
Fundamentally, the question arises: Should philosophers think differ-
ently about the advancement of science when they are looking at con-
tinuing research questions instead of past episodes? Our central con-
cern here is that normative accounts appealing to empirical success
can indeed produce unreliable conclusions if we think that the ap-
praisal of ongoing science builds on the same understanding as our
treatment of historical episodes. A central difficulty we will encounter
involves the changeability in disciplinary objectives that determine
what constitutes empirical success.
What are the considerations that philosophers must take into ac-
count before engaging with contemporary issues in a normative fash-
ion? As it has been pointed out, real science is rather messy and its
methods do not always coincide with the epistemic ideals of philoso-
phers (Medarwar, 1999; Schickore, 2008). We will discuss the chal-
lenges that arise from the inherent dynamics of disciplinary and ex-
perimental objectives in ongoing research practice, and we analyze
how these dynamics inform the evaluation of empirical success by
looking at three standard requirements of empirical success: data ac-
commodation, instrumental reliability, and predictive power. Our ar-
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rounding the model of a quantum nose in research on olfaction. No-
tably the public narrative of this controversy rests on a strongly dis-
torted perspective on the practitioners' debate and its measures of em-
pirical success. We conclude that the assessment of empirical success
in developing inquiry is set against the background of a model's inter-
active success and prospective value in an experimental context. Fur-
ther, we suggest an outline of network criteria by which to identify and
qualify the relevance of empirical evidence in ongoing science.
2. Problem: Confrontational narratives of model choice
For large parts of the history of science, research on the nose
was a playground for eccentrics, and the science of smell did not at-
tract broader scientific or philosophical attention. However, this has
changed recently, and research into the molecular and neural basis
of smell has increased exponentially over the last thirty years. To-
day olfaction constitutes an experimental system that promises greater
insight into ligand-receptor interactions and the organization of
higher-level brain processing (Firestein, 2001; Shepherd, 2004, 2012;
Axel, 2005; Barwich, 2015b, 2016). Meanwhile, its current dynamics
and susceptibility to the revision of its core premises make olfactory
research an excellent example to study the ambiguity of determining
what a reliable research strategy is.
The process of smelling is an interpretation of chemical informa-
tion in the environment through a specialized sensory system. Our
nose detects volatile airborne molecules (odorants), and our brain
makes sense of their physical information by turning them into percep-
tual qualities. While research on olfaction has progressed fundamen-
tally over the past years, a number of major questions remain open,
in particular, concerning the molecular recognition of smell. In com-
parison with the visual or auditory systems, the physical stimulus of
smell has not been captured in a comprehensive classification. Yet this
is not a result of the seemingly subjective nature of smells, but the
molecular characteristics of the olfactory stimulus. Instead of being
based on a low-dimensional parameter such as wavelength, the chem-
ical basis of smell is multidimensional, encompassing several thou-
sands of parameters (Ohloff, Pickenhagen, and Kraft 2011; Keller &
Vosshall, 2016). This complexity of the stimulus challenges experi-
mental approaches detailing the molecular machinery of odor recogni-
tion. To date, molecular biologists lack a sufficient understanding of
odor coding and how the olfactory receptors interact with their ligands
(Barwich, 2015b; Firestein, 2001).
About a decade ago a popular science book shone a spotlight onto
olfaction and this open question of how the nose detects scents: The
Emperor of Scent, a story about a quantum model of the nose that de-
tects infrared vibrations of airborne chemicals and its charismatic in-
ventor Luca Turin (Burr, 2004). The book presented the story of a
fierce competition between two rival theories regarding the molecu-
lar mechanism of smell recognition. It introduced the “vibration the-
ory of odors” against the orthodox model of the so-called “shape the-
ory.” While the shape theory refers to geometric and spatial proper-
ties as the causal features of odorants, the vibration theory states that
the odor of a molecule is linked to its intra-molecular vibrational fre-
quency. The shape theory is considered inadequate by vibration pro-
ponents, as it fails to provide robust regularities, let alone laws, which
link the smell of a molecule to its structure. Too many exceptions,
the reasoning goes, suggest that there may not be a rule. In contrast,
the quantum smell idea sounds neat and clear in its claims: there is
one key feature responsible for the odor of a molecule that allows
classifying smells according to their molecular basis (Turin, 1996,
2006, 2009). Turin's theory mirrored the dream of fragrance chemists
and perfumers throughout the 20th century, that there may be some
thing like a code in the nose that allows you to predict the smell of
molecules from their chemical structure. The vibration theory made
predictions. It accommodated irregular chemical data. Notwithstand-
ing, it is judged as being wrong.
Although firmly rejected by the majority of olfactory researchers,
this story was prefaced as an authentic controversy. Popular science
was quick to declare a potential victory for this idea, despite contin-
uous and consistently negative evaluation of the model by the olfac-
tory research community. After Turin's January 2013 publication of a
positive but only preliminary and singular study (Gane et al., 2013),
several media outlets prophetically declared the following: 'Quantum
smell' idea gains ground (Palmer, 2013, for BBC News); a Study Bol-
sters Quantum Vibration Scent Theory (Anderson, 2013, for Scien-
tific American); and the Controversial theory of smell is given a boost
(Ball, 2013, for Chemistry World). Some academic channels also pro-
claimed that the Secret of scent lies in molecular vibrations (Ryan,
2013, for UCL News). Even Nature News had been unable to resist
the temptation to herald an imminent paradigm change in Rogue the-
ory of smell gets a boost (Ball, 2006).
Interest in this apparent controversy in olfaction also entered philo-
sophical analysis. In particular, the eminent social epistemologist
Miriam Solomon upheld the quantum model of the nose as a great ex-
ample to analyze what she calls “norms of dissent” in scientific con-
troversies (2006a, 2006b, 2008). Solomon champions a normative role
for the philosophy of science that is not bound to a descriptive adop-
tion of the scientists' perspective on the implications of their work.
Throughout her works, involving both past as well as present inquiry,
Solomon has emphatically cautioned about the idea of an “invisible
hand” in science as a self-governing system of epistemic values. She
advises a guide for non-practitioners, such as philosophers or policy
makers, to assess the appropriateness of dissent in scientific debates.
The primary concern is to establish a normative model that identifies
fruitful competition and encourages discussion in situations of scien-
tific dissent. In this context, Solomon lists a measure of empirical,
epistemic, and social “decision-vectors” as criteria for the success of a
theory:
1. Theories on which there is dissent should each have associated em-
pirical success.
2. Empirical decision vectors should be equitably distributed, i.e., in
proportion to empirical success.
3. Non-empirical decision vectors should be equally distributed, i.e.,
the same number for each theory. (Solomon, 2006a, 2008, 6).
The controversy about the molecular basis of smell offered a great
opportunity for putting her model to the test. Notably the central cri-
terion that any scientific model must fulfill before qualifying for a
non-relativistic but rational decision-vector analysis is “empirical suc-
cess” (Solomon, 2001, Ch. 2). According to Solomon, empirical suc-
cess is not defined by a single criterion, however. Drawing on argu-
ments in the broader discourse in the philosophy of science, she ref-
erences empirical success as a conglomerate of different contributions
that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, ranging from “pre-
dictive accuracy (Van Fraassen's paradigm), explanatory power (Lau-
dan), technological success (Latour) or manipulative success (Hack-
ing)" (Solomon, 2001, 27). Henceforth, Solomon followed the public
narrative of an olfactory controversy in Burr (2004) and Turin (2006),
and she contrasted the vibration with the shape theory of odors, where
the latter was judged to be unable to provide robust shape-smell
correlations. The inherent narrative on which her approach built is
grounded in a “confrontational model” of theory-choice, analogous
to the ideal of the scientific method in the empirical sciences. It
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alizations about scientific theories can be tested against case studies
(traditionally historical ones, see Schickore, 2011, Kinzel, 2015). On
this account, Solomon weighted what she identified as the underlying
decision-vectors in this scenario and concluded that the olfactory com-
munity's dismissal is empirically unjustified and premature but based
on mere social bias.
Did Solomon's assessment do the scientific context and its empir-
ical basis justice? We all like a good story, of course, especially one
about a renegade scientist dismantling old-fashioned ideas of an os-
sified establishment. From an outsider's point of view, Turin's model
and the accompanying popular science narrative were indeed greeted
with fierce polemics, and the story was brushed off by the scientific
community (Nature Neuroscience Editorial, 2004; Vosshall, 2015). A
quote by the neurogeneticist Leslie Vosshall is perhaps the bluntest
expression in this context: “I like to think of the vibration theory of
olfaction and its proponents as unicorns. The rest of us studying olfac-
tion are horses. (…) The problem is that proving that a unicorn exists
or does not exist is impossible. This debate on the vibration theory or
the existence of unicorns will never end, but the very important under-
lying question of why things smell the way they do will continue to be
answered by the horses among us” (Vosshall quoted in Palmer, 2013).
But what this quote really expresses is a general frustration by olfac-
tory scientists with the public misrepresentation of their work. Scien-
tists operating with the standard model were seeing themselves por-
trayed as “incompetent villains,” and they saw the need to defend their
work against audiences that have “love[d] controversy (…) ever since
David and Goliath” but “who were ill qualified to judge its scientific
content” (Nature Neuroscience Editorial, 2004). It would be mislead-
ing to reduce the story of this pseudo-controversy to mere entertain-
ment value, though.
In essence, the main problem with Solomon's perpetuation of an
olfactory controversy is that there is no “shape theory of odors” (as
evoked in this narrative), nor does current olfactory research fail to
explain the chemical data. Something in the science narrative went
wrong here, and this should be taken seriously if we aim to pursue
philosophical studies of science with integrity. Scientists feeling them-
selves portrayed as villains may be one thing, but incompetent vil-
lains? What we encounter is a glaring dissonance between a scientific
community and its public portray. Is this simply a philosophical mis-
understanding of a single scientific episode? Unfortunately not.
The central narrative amplified here is of a homogeneous scien-
tific community that shuns the individual outsider, and the popularity
of this narrative draws support from increasing emphasis on the social
dimensions of scientific dissent in science studies. Only recently, the
philosopher Huw Price also wondered about a fringe controversy in
physics: Is cold fusion truly impossible, or is it just that no respectable
scientist can risk their reputation working on it? (Price, 2015)? Price
sees no primarily rational explanation for the biased choice against the
idea of cold fusion in favor of the standard explanation (“reputation
traps”). Instead, he sees it as rooted in social tensions. This perspec-
tive of the social marginalization of radically new ideas resonates with
the story of Turin in Burr's and Solomon's narrative. It also is the story
of Aubrey de Grey and his theory of longevity. There are a variety
of similarly framed disputes in which a controversy seems to endure
largely outside the expert community. To be sure, sometimes a good
theory really is neglected based on social prejudice. Notwithstanding,
not every one of these stories turns out to be a genuine Barbara Mc-
Clintock. Therefore, we should likewise ask ourselves that if almost
every expert in a field assures us that a model is wrong – or at least
highly problematic – what in our perspective from the philosophy and
social studies of science justifies the impression that it could be other-
wise?
What the confrontational vector-model fails to address, as we will
see in what follows, is how to assess the empirical problem in ques-
tion and, consequentially, how to qualify the empirical success of re-
search strategies. Any appropriate weighing of competing explana-
tions is conditional on whether a scientific conflict is resting on the
same objective of what it means to solve a problem successfully. On
this account, it is worth pointing out that Solomon's assessment stands
in stark contrast to the evaluation of data in the scientific community
and, as we will show, has not been supported by any experimental de-
velopments either. Henceforth, we now are engaging with three key
measures of empirical success, discussing how Solomon sees them in-
stantiated in the case of the olfactory example, before elaborating on
the grounds for what turns out to be a misevaluation.
3. Analysis: Three measures of empirical success
3.1. Empirical adequacy: Data accommodation and fit
The minimal requirement for any model to count as empirically
successful is that it accommodates the observational data (Van
Fraassen, 1980; Psillos, 1999). However, the qualification of such ex-
planatory fit is not unproblematic; that is “we need to distinguish be-
tween meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit’" (Forster, 2007, 588). In partic-
ular, this issue mirrors the distinction between truthful explanation or
the ‘saving of phenomena’ through the adjustment of model parame-
ters and ad hoc hypotheses. How do we assure and assess the appro-
priateness of data accommodation?
In scientific practice, the dilemma pointed at here is, in fact,
twofold. These two factors often run together but ought to be men-
tioned separately. First, consider the challenge of data selection. Sci-
entific models do not fit all possible data, but apply to particular sets of
data instead. How do we choose the relevant sets and, moreover, pri-
oritize between them? Second, scientific models usually do not man-
ifest a clear-cut accommodation of the relevant data sets either. The
preference for one empirically messy model over another may thus
be redirected to epistemic virtues, for example, concerning its parsi-
mony, unifying capacity, completeness, internal consistency, scope,
elegance, and so forth. That said, the value and assessment of epis-
temic virtues open up a range of separate philosophical problems.
A detailed look at the olfactory controversy soon exemplifies the
underlying problem: Data accommodation does not imply empirical
adequacy and, in turn, observational fit cannot warrant explanatory
accountability or success. According to the decision-vector model
(Solomon, 2006a, 2006b, 2008), the shape theory does not account for
the vast structural diversity of odorous molecules and, therefore, fails
to fit the observational data accurately. From this viewpoint, the em-
pirical adequacy of the shape theory is highly selective and compro-
mised in its fit with the chemical data. By contrast, the vibration theory
appears to accommodate a range of irregular structure-odor relations
(SORs) that pose an inherent issue for a shape-selective explanation of
smell. One salient example for this is the case of isosteric molecules,
which have the same shape yet different odor qualities (Sell, 2006).
The model of the quantum nose claims to provide an explanation for
such irregular cases of SORs (Turin 2006, 2009).
Failure of data accommodation implies some form of a measure
for success. What is the decisive factor in the evaluation of SORs?
The main problem with the narrative of an olfactory controversy is
that it debates a straw man. The irregularity of SORs does not con-
stitute a failure of the shape theory of odors - simply because such a
theory does not exist today. So how did this idea come about? Ac-
cording to Solomon, the “traditional model” of olfaction appeals to a
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when a molecule has a correct fit with a complementary shaped recep-
tor: “The generally accepted theory of scent is that particular scents
are detected by shape receptors in the nose, which detect the shape of
the molecules (or parts of the molecules) that make up those scents
(Solomon, 2006a,28, 2008, 9).” This simplified characterization of ol-
faction refers to the old lock-and-key model for enzyme reaction, orig-
inally proposed by Emil Fischer in 1894.
Historically, Fischer's lock-and-key model indeed provided the
central heuristics for research on smell throughout the 20th century
and up to the discovery of the olfactory receptors in 1991. Drawing
on the presumed specificity relation between a substrate and its bind-
ing receptor, it was none other than Linus Pauling (1946) who pro-
posed a similar mechanism for olfactory recognition by suggesting a
correlation between the shape and size of a molecule and its smell.
In this context, systematic investigations into the molecular basis of
odors only started in the mid-20th century (Barwich, 2015a). The ex-
planatory centrality of molecular shape and size was reinforced by
contemporary technological innovations, such as X-ray crystallogra-
phy, liquid gas and affinity chromatography, and mass spectrometry.
These technologies allowed for more detailed knowledge of the struc-
tural arrangement of molecular compounds. One might even say that
these technological innovations facilitated the golden era of fragrance
chemistry.
Under the premise of a shape-sensitive mechanism, Robert
Moncrieff (1949) worked out a more detailed hypothesis, referring to
steric (i.e., geometrical) properties of molecules underlying odor de-
tection. Labeled the “Steric Theory of Odors,” John Amoore (1964,
1970) furthered this approach by stipulating a range of odor types in
relation to their space-filling properties. As a rule of thumb, mole-
cules with a similar geometrical and spatial configuration were sup-
posed to smell alike. Amoore also tested these odor classes with psy-
chophysical experiments on anosmic patients (people unable to smell
specific kinds of odors). Nonetheless, stereochemical classifications
of odor types were riddled with exceptions, and Amoore's idea of pri-
mary odors appeared too simplistic to explain the huge structural di-
versity of odorants (Ohloff et al., 2011).
These historical developments provide the backdrop against which
Solomon places her assessment. According to her, the dominance of
the standard model is justified not by its empirical fit but greater his-
torical endurance, and the prevalence of the standard model is ex-
plained by reference to social decision-vectors that entail a “[c]onser-
vativeness in the academic community. There is a general resistance
to changing the theory that has had a monopoly for at least 30 years
(Solomon, 2006a, pp. 30, 2008, 15).” Such conservativeness of the
scientific community, she insinuated, obscured the inherent empirical
problem of data accommodation in current scientific debate.
Alternatively, “the vibrational theory of odor” was introduced as
providing a resolution to the irregularity of SORs. At first, this nar-
rative seems to find support in examples from earlier studies on a
precursor to the vibration theory of odors. One of the first explicitly
chemical hypotheses, mentioning molecular vibrations, was proposed
by Malcolm Dyson in the late 1920s and 1930s (Dyson 1928, 1938).1
However, at the time it was unclear how molecular vibrations might be
detected by a biological system. Dyson's theory was taken up and ex-
panded a few decades later by Robert Wright in the 1960s and 1970s.
Wright (1964, 1977) found that a range of bitter almonds exhibied
a regular correspondence of vibration patterns and odor quality. En-
visaging a possible mechanism for the transduction of molecular vi-
brations, the theoretical vision of a “spectroscope made out of flesh”
drove Wright's creative but unsuccessful efforts to revive a vibration
theory of odor.2
It is against this historical background that Turin (1996, 2006)
questioned the premise of the so-called shape theory with its premise
of a causal similarity between olfactory responses and stereochem-
istry. In essence, he saw the so-called shape theory as posing a flawed
structural assumption to begin with. Drawing on the earlier invention
of a device involving electron spectroscopy by Jaklevic and Lambe
(1966), he proposed a mechanism that stipulated the detection of mol-
ecular vibrations through inelastic electron tunneling spectroscopy
(IETS). This is a quantum phenomenon in which electrons can jump
small gaps between a donor and an acceptor. The IETS-model stip-
ulates that such tunneling occurs in ligand binding. Turin's model
is creative, and his presentation of it makes for occasionally com-
pelling reading, but it has not been provided with any experimental
links to protein studies to date. For the plausibility of his specula-
tive model, Turin explicitly roots his model in the failure of the stan-
dard shape-selective account to accommodate the structural diversity
1 Dyson's idea originated from his early studies involving element substitutions of
chlorine compounds with heavier bromine and iodine elements. Two observations
had caught his attention. First, molecules of the same shape can smell dissimilar
whilst molecules with different shapes can smell alike. Second, the smell of
a molecule gradually and constantly changes in relation to substitutions with
heavier atoms. Could this mean that there is a causal connection between the
odor of molecules and their molecular mass? Yet Dyson's emerging hypothesis
about molecular vibrations remained vague, as there was no form of measurement
available at the time. Only with the discovery of the Raman effect of light
diffraction and photon emission did his hypothesis acquire empirical meaning.
Following this, Dyson suggested that molecular vibrations in the Raman spectrum
correlate with odor quality.
2 Optical spectroscopy seemed out of the question, as one problem of an infrared
light source is that it would roast its organic surroundings. The only alternative,
he reasoned, was to postulate a mechanical interaction—a strategic move with
major theoretical implications. It meant that the only energy source exciting the
hypothetical receptors must be thermal motion. As a result, the energy involved is
small, and the detectable range of molecular vibrations is restricted to a maximum
of 1000 wave numbers (cm-1). Unlike Dyson, Wright identified far-infrared
frequencies to underlie odor perception, but excluded near-infrared
ones. Notwithstanding his exemplary studies on bitter almonds, exhibiting a
regular correspondence of vibration patterns and odor quality, Wright's frequency
restrictions posed insoluble problems. His mechanical model failed to explain the
strong smell of small molecules whose frequencies lie outside the theoretically
detectable range such as ammonia (NH3) or hydrogen cyanide (HCN). Another
obstacle impeding the success of Wright's idea was the instrumental requirement
for the measurement of far-infrared frequencies, as a spectroscope was not a
readily accessible instrument for contemporary researchers. As a consequence,
most of Wright's experimental results could not easily be reproduced. The final
straw that led contemporaries to abandon his theory was the case of enantiomers
(i.e., mirror-imaged molecules). Enantiomers are identical in shape and vibration
spectrum, the only difference is their spatial orientation. Studies of enantiomers
in the 1970s, showing that some enantiomers with identical vibrations have a
different smell, were seen as the most irrefutable objection to the vibration theory
(Barwich, 2015a). By the 1980s, sporadic interest in the vibration theory of odors
had passed. In light of the rapidly growing accumulation of synthetic materials
and the improvement of statistical techniques for the comparison of molecular
parameters, olfactory research in fragrance chemistry proceeded to pursue the
study of odorants through an extension of the concept of chemical similarity
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of chemical data. From this perspective, Solomon judges the current
strategies to accommodate irregular chemical data through flexible re-
ceptor behavior to represent a case of having ‘fudged the fit.’
What this evaluation overlooks is a fundamental change in the sci-
entific understanding of the causal principles in primary odor recogni-
tion. This paradigmatic change has impacted the prioritization of data
sets as well as the underlying understanding of empirical fit. Research
on olfaction in the 20th century is divided into the time before and
after the discovery of the olfactory receptors in 1991 (Buck & Axel,
1991; Firestein, Greer, and Mombaerts 2014). Yet this key event in ol-
factory science gets heavily sidelined in the narrative about the quan-
tum nose controversy, which instead details a receptor model with in-
sights from the 1940s to the 1970s; notably, a time where the gen-
eral existence of cell surface receptors was a highly speculative idea
(Barwich & Bschir, 2017). As a result, Solomon's assessment fails to
account for the huge impact this discovery had on the field.
The significance of the receptor discovery cannot be overstated,
and Linda Buck and Richard Axel received the 2004 Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine for their breakthrough. Until recently, biol-
ogists were unable to conclusively determine the precise molecular
features responsible for smell perception simply because the mam-
malian olfactory receptors were unknown. Before the receptor discov-
ery, research on the molecular basis of odors mainly took place in fra-
grance chemistry. Fragrance chemists sought out regularities between
the structure of molecules and their odor quality, leading to the de-
velopment of rules for structure-odor relations. After the receptor dis-
covery, molecular biology and neuroscience became more prominent
for the explanation of smell (Barwich, 2015a). On that account, the
doctrine of the lock-and-key model does not only present a simplifi-
cation, but it is also considered to be an outdated description of mol-
ecular mechanisms and odor chemistry today. While the lock-and-key
analogy remains a useful idealization, it is not considered an adequate
account of the biological mechanism, nor is it deemed to provide a
shortcut to robust structure-odor rules. Moreover, the relation between
structure and odor is much more complex than the notion of shape
indicates. From a chemistry perspective alone, the concept of chem-
ical similarity between odorants encompasses a multitude of features
“like molecular weight, functional groups, polarity, acidity, basicity,
and steric interactions” (Hettinger, 2011). Besides, before the recep-
tor discovery, it was also uncertain in the context of molecular bio-
logical research whether odors were even detected by anything such
as “shape receptors.” Although growing evidence indicated the poten-
tial involvedment of a G-coupled protein in the olfactory transduction
mechanism by the late 1980s, some studies had also been pursuing al-
ternatives to receptor models; for example, by considering odor detec-
tion via the activation of ion channels (Buck, 2004). Thus, Solomon's
narrative that alludes to a theoretical conservativeness in the scientific
community, as always favoring “shape receptors” to be the paradigm,
is rendered historically untenable and fictitious.
Overall the experimental implications of Buck and Axel's find-
ings for research on smell were wide-ranging. When Buck and Axel
(1991) discovered a multigene family encoding the olfactory recep-
tors in the mammalian genome, their findings integrated research on
the olfactory pathway into mainstream neurobiology because they
identified smell receptors as G-protein coupled receptors (GPCRs).
GPCRs constitute the largest receptor gene family in the mammalian
genome; they take part in a variety of fundamental physiological
processes and bind to a variety of structurally different ligands, includ-
ing hormones, peptides, neurotransmitters, odorants, and even pho-
tons (Snogerup-Linse, 2012). The discovery of the olfactory GPCRs
now allowed for the functional analysis and detailed studies
of odor activation on sensory neurons. These studies established the
combinatorial nature of receptor activation, meaning that one receptor
recognizes several ligands and one ligand can be detected by several
receptors (Malnic, Hirono, Sato, & Buck, 1999). Rather than “over-
all shape,” the causality of odorants is defined through a component
analysis of various molecular features in interaction with conforma-
tional changes of the olfactory receptors (Barwich, 2015a). Conse-
quently, this insight into the combinatorial nature of receptor activa-
tion made the search for straightforward structure-odor rules seem like
an intuitive but naïve miscalculation. Meanwhile, the receptor discov-
ery further allowed for the tracing of stimulus activation patterns from
the sensory neurons in the nasal epithelium to the olfactory bulb. It
thereby paved the way for the integration of olfaction into the advanc-
ing experimental content of sensory neuroscience (Axel, 2005).
The upshot of this detailed analysis is that the appropriateness of
data accommodation entails more than a comparison of idealized ob-
servational fits between two models. Rather, it necessitates a qual-
ification with regards to the mutable disciplinary objectives and
(dis)continuities that define an empirical problem. The receptor dis-
covery signified a benchmark event and change in the disciplinary ob-
jectives that turned olfaction from a domain in analytic chemistry to a
promising new subject in neurobiology. Here, olfaction emerged as a
new model for understanding the strong evolutionary ties of signaling
proteins. Previously irregular structure-odor irregularities were now
subject to flexible receptor behavior. Instead of a rigid lock-and-key
premise from the 1970s, modern biology considers energy profiles
and conformational changes as pivotal to understanding binding be-
havior and activation (Barwich, 2015b). Comparative observations of
shape-selective and vibrational SORs thus do not map onto the cen-
tral issue of modern olfactory research, namely the interaction-gov-
erning receptor behavior.3 In this context, Solomon's analysis of what
constitutes the empirical fit in both theories is not representative of
contemporary research but references an understanding of olfaction
prior to 1991, more precisely the science of smell of Amoore from the
1960–70s.
3.2. Instrumental reliability: Reproducibility and robustness
The empirical success of a model is further conditional on whether
it reliably generates and replicates the observational data in an exper-
imental setting. Such reliability is ensured in two ways. On the one
hand, it hinges on the reproducibility of data through similar methods
and across comparable settings. On the other hand, instrumental reli-
ability designates the robustness of findings. Solomon praises robust-
ness as an essential requirement for model choice, as it indicates that
the evidence in question is sufficiently independent of a particular the-
ory or the theory-ladenness of observations (2001, 28).
First, beginning with the reproducibility of research, the various
challenges that accompany this issue have received a vast amount of
attention in the natural and social sciences in the ensuing “replication
crisis” lately (Ioannidis, 2005). Three kinds of reproducibility stand
out in this context, namely “method reproducibility,” “results repro-
ducibility,” and “inferential reproducibility” (Goodman, Fanelli, and
Ioannidis 2016). Essentially, method reproducibility implies the sta-
bility of results from the same technologies and kinds of data analy-
sis. It is closely linked to results reproducibility, which involves the
3 The claim of a recent machine learning study to predict odor from molecular
structure (Keller et al., 2017) must, therefore, be seen with caution (Gilbert, 2017),
especially in light of empirical results that stand in contrast to Keller et al.’s










6 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) xxx-xxx
corroboration of results from previous studies with new data. Lastly,
inferential reproducibility means that the same data gives rise consis-
tently to the same theoretical conclusions. To be sure, a variety of fac-
tors can affect the implementation of these reproducibility measures,
for example, the signal to measurement-error ratio or the complexity
of the experimental design.
Second, robustness is another instantiation of instrumental reliabil-
ity that is considered to facilitate better evidence. Robustness refers
to datasets that are derived from multiple, independent investigative
sources (Wimsatt, 2007). Nonetheless, appeals to robustness yield
practical problems as well. Sometimes, multiple techniques may not
be available. Conversely, the generation of commensurable data from
various and independent methods can be difficult. This poses a par-
ticularly tricky problem for the philosophical analysis of contempo-
rary scientific developments, as “concordance is easier to see in retro-
spect, with a selective filter for reconstructions of scientific success”
(Stegenga, 2009, 655).
The epistemic concern arising from these methodological issues is
the question of how to ensure that our scientific conclusions are vali-
dated consistently through continuing experimentation. In ongoing re-
search, this concern is heightened by the fact that both the data and its
interpretations are subject to repeated revision (Chang, 2006; Elliott,
2012). Hence, how can we recognize the coherence of a research strat-
egy in flexible research contexts? The identification of a robust re-
search strategy entails more than a quantification of the multimodal
lines of evidence. It also requires the explication of inconsistency in
data production, changing selection criteria, and incompatible tech-
niques. Plus, coherence in data production may not even be the best
sign of an empirically successful model either.
What we must consider before any quantification of experimental
evidence is its qualification. Cartwright (2007) has argued for the sig-
nificance of grading evidence regarding the quality and the relevance
of data production. According to her, there are experiments of high
quality but low relevance and, vice versa, there can be experiments of
low quality but high relevance. In turn, we face two related yet sepa-
rate considerations. On the one hand, we must ensure the articulation
of data pertinence for a specific hypothesis. On the other hand, there
is the assessment of the actual quality of the data. So, what are the cri-
teria for justifications of data relevance?
In our example of the olfactory controversy, Solomon grants Tur-
in's theory sufficient instrumental reliability by stating that “most of
his smell observations are replicated by chemists or fragrance sci-
entists” (Solomon, 2006a, 30, 2008, 14). This expectation has – at
least so far – not been confirmed. Or in the more candid words of
Gilbert (2017): “In a grand substitution of ego for psychophysics,
Turin claims that Turin's theory successfully predicts odors because
they smell the way Turin says they do.” There have not been any
successful replications of Turin's observations to date, and it is un-
clear to which replications Solomon refers. To the contrary, a study
by Keller and Vosshall (2004) at Rockefeller University set out for
an explicit test of one of the central claims of Turin's model, involv-
ing the smell of isotopic variants. Given that isotopic variants have
a similar stereochemistry (shape) but different intra-molecular vibra-
tions (i.e., different wavenumbers), they ought to smell different to the
human nose. Keller and Vosshall (2004) recorded that test panelists
were unable to tell a difference in the odor of deuterated acetophe-
none and its parent compound. Solomon, aware of this negative study,
marked it as proof of the antagonism Turin faces through the estab-
lishment (Solomon, 2006a, 30, 2008, 12). Nonetheless, even Turin's
subsequent reproduction of Keller and Vosshall's experiment came to
the same negative results (Gane et al., 2013). Here, we find multiple
studies testing the same premise with a similar experimental design,
aiming at the reproducibility of the results. It thus stands to reason that
the dismissal of the underlying hypothesis cannot be based mainly on
social or publication bias.
In reply to the negative outcome of his replication of Keller and
Vosshall's experiments, Turin reinterpreted the findings. Alterna-
tively, he now entertained the option that the difference in frequency
between the isotopes might be too weak to result in an odor difference
strong enough to be perceived. To test this ad hoc hypothesis, another
study with an altered experimental design was conducted. For this, his
team specifically designed a musk molecule with enhanced features
(i.e., deuterated cyclopentadecanone). These isotopes contained more
hydrogen and deuterium bonds that, if Turin's assumption about the
nature of isotope perception is right, must surely result in a percepti-
ble odor difference. The assumption turned out to be supported by the
experimental results; the human subjects in this study were able to tell
the isotopes apart (Gane et al., 2013).
Similar to his earlier studies, Turin's latest results were considered
insufficient and not supportive of the vibrational theory. One main rea-
son is that psychophysical studies are rarely conceded to be a deci-
sive factor in settling theoretical disputes. Sensory measurements, es-
pecially of olfactory performance in humans, are notoriously difficult
and thus do not provide the most reliable source for the reproducibil-
ity of methods and results because of their causal multidimensionality
and limited degree of control (Barwich & Chang, 2015). For this rea-
son, the quality of Turin's data is viewed as too meager to warrant its
strong theoretical conclusion at present. The observed perceptual ef-
fect could have been affected by too many variables that, furthermore,
may not have been accounted for in the experimental set-up. In light
of this, Turin's 2013 study only has high relevance with respect to his
own theory, and not in the context of olfactory research in general.
Moreover, the inferential fit between the explanation and the experi-
mental design was found as either too weak or inconsistent by his col-
leagues. In reply to Turin's study, the chemist Eric Block responded
that “Turin can't have it both ways: either noses can smell deuterium
or they can't” (Anderson, 2013). Block's verdict may be revisable in
light of future developments, but – in Cartwright's terms – Turin's data
thus far has only carried supportive implications for his own frame-
work with menial qualitative strength and limited connections to the
general context of olfactory research.
So what kind of evidence is needed to reinforce the vibration the-
ory? Responses to Turin in the olfactory community have been uni-
vocal in that respect: The problem with Turin's model is its sheer ab-
sence of protein-related experimental data. His psychophysical studies
merely represent indirect observations, which test inferences from a
highly speculative mechanism but fail to address the empirical feasi-
bility or implementation of said mechanism. In Richard Axel's view:
“Until somebody really sits down and seriously addresses the mech-
anism and not inferences from the mechanism … it does not seem a
useful endeavour to use behavioural responses as an argument. […]
Do not get me wrong, I'm not writing off this theory, but I need data
and it has not been presented” (Axel quoted in Palmer, 2013).
Therefore, what fosters scientific caution against the strong claims
of vibrationalists is that Turin's model lacks any evidence that deals
with the empirical data required to assist its core claim. Because
if you want to make an argument against the striking evolutionary
ties of GPCRs and say that olfaction works contrary to everything
we know about biology thus far (Palmer, 2013), then you had bet-
ter show it with data of the receptors as the key causal entity in
your claim. Meanwhile, a recent multi-method and multi-lab study by
Block et al. (2015) proceeded to test Turin's claim of the differen-
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ceptors do respond differently to isotopic variants. Again, the result
was negative. In response, Turin mitigated the relevance of this test by
stating that Block et al.’s in vitro study may not account for in vivo
effects. That said, the IETS-model itself lacks any experimental tests
on GPCRs to this date (i.e., a conceivable study could have been an
explicit functional comparison in the detection of vibrational features,
as it has been done with stereochemical parameters in Malnic et al.
(1999).)
In fairness, Solomon could have hardly anticipated results of more
recent studies. However, her framework did fail to correctly distin-
guish and estimate the relevance and quality of the evidential data
that was available at the time of her analysis. We saw that the scien-
tific community had already strongly criticized Turin's model as being
too anecdotal and inappropriate in light of the central causal entity of
odor recognition: the protein receptors. Furthermore, the support for
Turin's model was considered to lack sufficient quality regarding the
reproducibility and strength of its methods and inferences. By con-
trast, when other laboratories offered negative evidence subsequently,
it was both in the form of causal relevance (Block et al., 2015) and
reproducibility (the replication of Keller & Vosshall, 2004 in Gane et
al., 2013).
In recap, we saw that appeals to empirical success in theory choice
can yield incorrect conclusions if we neglect to specify the reliability
and robustness of data in parallel with its relevance. Such qualifica-
tion of data involves not only the articulation of its importance for a
particular hypothesis, but also its embeddedness in a broader discipli-
nary context. Besides, the differential weight of positive and negative
evidence must be not be forgotten in this setting either.
3.3. A good predictor of new phenomena
The last feature of empirical success we want to discuss is predic-
tive power. ‘Prediction’ is a future-oriented term that refers to the ac-
quisition of knowledge not previously associated with a target system.
Predictive models or theories facilitate accurate expectations about the
properties or behavior of the investigated materials. Nonetheless, what
counts as a prediction can imply different things (Barrett & Stanford,
2006). One understanding of successful prediction resonates with the
procedure of inductive inference in the empirical sciences. If we con-
firm a hypothesis about an entity based on previous, similar findings,
this may count as a successful prediction in a wider sense. Another un-
derstanding of prediction rests on the deductive-nomological model.
On this account, we derive hypotheses about an entity from general
laws as knowledge about the structural features of a target system,
rather than empirical observations.
Epistemic challenges regarding the value of such predictions ad-
dress the question of how novel the findings from these procedures
must be. In other words, is it sufficient for a predictive model to con-
nect previously separate observations, or do the findings need to yield
unencountered data? Some philosophers, like Lakatos, applied a strict
notion of prediction that requires findings to be “improbable” or “im-
possible” according to current understanding (Lakatos, 1970). Others,
like Musgrave (1974) and Leplin (1997), allowed for a weaker no-
tion of prediction as data accommodation but with a strict measure
of success in a competitive scenario. From their view, a theoretical
framework is superior to its rival only if, when one directly compares
their assumptions, both cannot entail the same result of a possible test.
‘Not entailed’ in this case means that either the observations conflict
with one of the rivals or present a result on which the rival remains
silent. The difference in these two appeals to prediction mirrors the
distinction of historical and logical relations between theory and evi-
dence (Barrett & Stanford, 2006; Musgrave, 1974).
Philosophers of science have commonly preferred logical relations
over historical ones since the former provide a greater independence
from the contingency of observational methods. Nevertheless, logi-
cal relations do not necessarily produce an explanation (Rosenberg,
1994). Also, in light of the multiple realizability of phenomena, es-
pecially in the biological sciences, we are further confronted with an
equivalent of the problem of the underdetermination of theories by
observational data (Stanford, 2006). Therefore, in light of potentially
ambiguous correlations, predictive relations must be somewhat char-
acteristic of their target system. Notwithstanding, the definition of
such characteristics as modeling constraints inevitably brings us back
to a historical account of evidential relations.
Starting with the stricter notion of predictive success, the appeal
of the vibration theory in Solomon's narrative is a distinct discovery
on which Turin builds his case. Challenging widespread objections to
his idea of smell as a spectral sense, Turin set out to make a predic-
tion of odor from a molecule's vibrational spectrum. He went look-
ing for two molecules that correspond in both odor quality and vi-
bration frequency but that exhibit a different stereochemical configu-
ration. To remove doubts about their perceptual similarity the odor-
ants needed a distinctive smell. The choice fell on sulfur where the
frequency of the SH-bond was outside the vibrational range of most
known odorants. Calculating vibration patterns of diatomic molecules
a frequency close to the SH-bond (2500 wave numbers (cm-1)) was
found in the BH-bonds of boranes (2550 wave numbers (cm-1)). The
sulfurous smell of boranes had been remarked prior to Turin (Stitt,
1941). What caught Turin's attention is that “Borane and Sulfur are
not in the same column of the periodic table. They have no shape and
no chemistry in common" (Turin quoted in Burr, 2004, 416). In turn,
the geometrical configurations and electronic properties of molecules
composed of borane bonds differ significantly from those of sulfur.
The question is whether sulfur and boranes really smell similar. Un-
fortunately, a simple smell test would not do, as boranes are rocket fu-
els and explode spontaneously on contact with air. A test with a less
temperamental but toxic decaborane (B10H14) seems to confirm Tur-
in's idea; boranes smell sulfurous. In support of Turin's perception, Al-
fred Stock, the inventor of boranes, commented on their smell as being
“reminiscent of sulfur” as early as 1912 (Berger, 2012). The sulfur-bo-
rane prediction is intriguing as part of a collection of structure-odor
examples where Turin (2009) sees a failure of the traditional stereo-
chemical model. It further presents an unlikely correlation of data that
fulfills the above criteria of Laudan, Musgrave, and Leplin. Nonethe-
less, why is this prediction insufficient to grant the IETS-model satis-
factory empirical success or epistemic equivalence? Does the lack of
appraisal for this prediction ground in the conservativeness of the sci-
entific community, as Solomon suggests?
When we return to the examination of olfaction in section 3.1, it
is evident why structure-odor rules were at the heart of olfactory the-
orizing before the receptor discovery. SORs provided the sole empir-
ical source for any hypothesis about the molecular detection mecha-
nism. However, we also found that the question of chemical similar-
ity was revised in light of receptor behavior (for details see Barwich,
2015a). For this reason, Turin's prediction offers an interesting corre-
lation that remains too coincidental. As a single observation, it lacks a
sufficient empirical grounding for its causal explanation and remains
a coincidence that may be due to a variety of other causal factors.
And no further predictions were provided since 1996; notably not
even 20 years later when Solomon took on this case. The logical rela-
tion between the IETS-model and its evidence thus remains inciden-
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characteristics of the receptors. These characteristics refer to an evo-
lutionary understanding of the olfactory receptors as GPCRs. GPCRs
share a strikingly large amount of conserved amino acid sequences,
pointing at their shared evolutionary roots and development of a lig-
and-binding mechanism (Snogerup-Linse, 2012).
Meanwhile, it would be a mistake to understand the significance of
the receptor discovery as a mere confirmation of what Solomon took
to be the orthodox model (i.e., prediction in the weaker sense), largely
because there had been no orthodox model. Before the mid-1980s, ol-
faction was not considered to operate on a molecular mechanism com-
parable to other sensory signaling processes (Buck, 2004). The heuris-
tic analogy of the lock-and-key mechanism may have instructed dis-
course in fragrance chemistry, but its molecular implementation was
speculative and not entirely without skepticism until the discovery of
the actual receptor genes. Consequently, this finding presented novel
empirical knowledge and embedded olfaction into the wider experi-
mental context of neurobiology, establishing its molecular ties with
other cell membrane proteins.
In effect, the receptor discovery itself yielded unexpected insights
into the details of odor recognition that fundamentally revised scien-
tific understanding of the molecular basis of odor. Just consider: Be-
fore their discovery, the number of olfactory receptors was estimated
to be around 30–100. Surpassing these estimations by far, Buck and
Axel found over 500 receptors; and this number has exceeded 1000
today. (To put this into perspective, the largest known receptor fam-
ily at the time was serotonin with a less than impressive number of 15
members!) Their sheer size in parallel with a highly diverse genetic
make-up opened up a plethora of new questions about these receptors
and their ligand-binding behavior,4 further changing our understand-
ing of the molecular recognition process: "The problem is thus to ac-
count for a binding pocket that is analogous to that of other transmit-
ter receptors and photoreceptors but can interact differently with dif-
ferent molecules. Thus, in contrast with the traditional lock-and-key
metaphor for enzymatic and receptor specificity, the olfactory recep-
tor is hypothesized to function by a broad affinity mechanism. This is
an example of a new concept of receptor activation involving broad
receptor-signal interactions” (Shepherd, 2012; emphasis added).
What reads like a dogmatic slumber of the biological community in
Solomon's analysis was, in fact, the awakening of olfaction as a mod-
ern molecular model system for neurobiology. With this corrected un-
derstanding of the olfactory “controversy” in mind, we can now come
to a conclusion about the challenges that philosophers face in their
analysis of contemporaneous scientific research.
4. Discussion: Why there is no real scientific controversy in
olfaction
Although empirical success is the foundation of scientific advance-
ment, we have seen that its explication is not without obstacles. Our
analysis of the olfactory pseudo-controversy brought to light that sci-
entific evaluations of a model's empirical success are structured by
the disciplinary objectives of what counts as the empirical problem in
question. Notably these objectives are inherently dynamic and subject
to change. In fact, what counts as an empirical problem is subject to
continuous developments, so much so that what might be considered
an issue at one time, can convert into a representation of data com-
plexity only a few years later. While these changes rest partly on his
4 These significant empirical developments and their theoretical implications have
yet to be addressed by Turin and his supporters – who still seem to prefer beating
up an undeserving John Amoore with his best intentions to understand the invisible
molecular world of smell in the 1970s.
torical contingencies, they were also shown to reside in developments
that are of relevance for the general philosophical study of science. We
saw that the quantification of empirical success inevitably builds on a
specification of relevance in observational attribution.
What are the concrete philosophical consequences we can draw
from this particular episode? The first point we must acknowledge is
that the story of the quantum nose does not constitute merely an iso-
lated episode or misrepresentation of a scientific discourse. Many ad-
vocates of fringe science have relied heavily on the narrative of an
oppressive establishment that ignores and excludes the spirited pio-
neers and the evidence for their work (e.g., Price's account of scien-
tific dissent about cold fusion followed a similar pattern, so does the
public hype around Aubrey de Grey, and other comparable cases;5 for
specifics on fringe science narratives with the example of gravitational
waves see also Collins (2014)). The fact that certain lines of research
did not take place as part of mainstream science requires more careful
examination for why it is not considered mainstream or, alternatively,
what might be required for its integration into mainstream research.
(For instance, we might ask, how can a speculative model proactively
contribute to current experiments and concepts without being used ex-
clusively to apply only to its own framework; like in the case of the
currently self-referential tests of the IETS-model).
A particular issue with too many public narratives on scientific
controversies is that they sometimes emphasize the social dynamics
as the decisive element over the empirical evidence without, how-
ever, engaging sufficiently with said social contexts.6 This can result
in highly distorted narratives of scientific disputes. And those read-
ers not sharing my interest in the olfactory community might be re-
minded of the impact that such overemphasis on social dynamics in
research had on the perception of climate science (Collins, 2012). In-
deed, Collins & Evans, (2009) in Rethinking Expertise have provided
a profound analysis about why there is more to scientific expertise and
competence than social credibility.
Perhaps the strong appeal to accepting a social perspective is a
problematic heritage of the psychological mob dynamics that philoso-
phers and sociologists have read into Kuhn's ideas of paradigm
changes, an interpretation he himself felt forced to object in the re-
mainder of his life (Kuhn, 1977). To be sure, all of this is not to
deny the importance of situating science as a social enterprise, but it
may really be necessary to refocus our efforts on the epistemic and
5 It is worth pointing out that the issue here is not whether cold fusion itself is
possible, or whether Aubrey de Grey's theory of longevity may not have its merits,
but – rather – what characterizes the official narratives in introducing these ideas
as controversies.
6 In fact, there are several issues with regard to the social narrative of the quantum
nose. Prior to the olfactory receptor discovery, there was hardly a homogeneous or
powerfully organized community working on the biology of the olfactory system.
Salient exceptions like Gordon Shepherd and Randy Reed, pioneered the field, but
their interest in olfaction was not considered part of mainstream research. Before
their breakthrough, Buck nor Axel weren't even on the map of olfaction research.
Buck had been a senior postdoctoral researcher in Axel's lab, and while the latter
was highly regarded in molecular biology he did not have ties to research on smell
at the time. Additionally, the popularized portrayal of the olfactory community
as consisting of conservative molecular biologists, who oppose any notion of
quantum physics, does not account for the changing nature of the field that has
also started to attract other physicists, such as Andreas Mershin and Dima Rinberg,
who do not necessarily agree with Turin's model either. Neither is it fitting to brand
Turin, having worked at prestigious institutions like UCL and MIT, as an academic
outsider. And in this correction of social vectors, it is somewhat problematic
that Solomon (2006a, 2008) anticipated gender biases to be in place when she
questioned whether the shape theory might have been the dominant theory for
implementing a “penetration metaphor.” Yet, at the same time her account neglects
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empirical dimensions of research practices. What can go wrong in
our public science narratives such that specialist and non-practitioner
views on evidence differ so fundamentally, as they do in the olfactory
case, and yet are placed on a somewhat equal empirical and epistemic
footing?
In light of this challenge, we must be aware of our own narrative
constraints or biases in rational reconstructions of scientific develop-
ments. The identification of observational relevance in an open-ended
scientific investigation is not determined exhaustively by the pub-
lished and publically available data, as any scientific community op-
erates by a form of “silent knowledge” that structures the internal dy-
namics of a field. This silent knowledge comes in several shapes and
forms, such as negative results, replication failures, scientists holding
off the publication of data to use in grant applications, informal ex-
changes between colleagues about their current work, gossip between
labs, and so on (Firestein, 2012).
It is important to point out that these factors are more than merely
social but inherently epistemic; they embody strategies to communi-
cate and distribute information and research tendencies in a way that is
closely correlated with the objectives of ongoing inquiry, which is ad-
vancing far too fast to be waiting for everything to appear delayed in
an official publication. The rise of pre-print archives and the increased
call for an outlet of negative results are interesting developments in
this context (Berg et al., 2016).
So how should we think about philosophical expertise and situate
it in relation to science in practice? Naturally such “silent knowledge”
seems to lack transparency from an outsider's perspective, and so it
enforces philosophical analysis of modern science to become more
closely embedded in scientific practice by what Harry Collins calls in-
teractional expertise (Collins & Evans, 2009). Interactional expertise
is complementary to the specialist expertise of the scientist. Collins
identified scientific expertise as distinct from other kinds of practice,
viewing it primarily as a matter of experience and exchange with other
practitioners. In this context, interactional expertise involves the con-
ceptual understanding of a science “from within” by participant obser-
vation, without necessarily having the skills of its practitioners. A sci-
entist without hands so to speak.7 Many philosophers of science have
engaged with science to a higher degree from the critical distance, so
much so that one could consider this a form of referred expertise, the
application of know-how from one domain to another one (Collins &
Evans, 2009). Nonetheless, Collins (2012) also emphasizes that this
kind of skill is often insufficient for judging scientific developments.8
And the case at hand has further demonstrated the philosophical sig-
nificance of this insufficiency.
It is important to understand that the special nature of interactional
expertise is not limited to a linguistic capacity to “walk the talk,” and
to adopt the lingo of an expert discourse. Crucial to the acquisition of
interactional expertise is a form of epistemic fluency, meaning to be
7 Collins convincingly demonstrated that such interactive engagement leads to
the acquisition of a special proficiency of being able to “walk the talk.” In an
experiment, Collins and a scientific practitioner were asked technical questions
(designed by scientists) about gravitational waves, a domain Collins has studied
“on site” for several years. The answers were anonymized and given to other
specialists, who had to decide which one of the answers is from the real scientific
professional. Collins made an intellectual bet, and he won; he passed as a scientist
in the eyes of other experts (Collins, 2012; Collins & Evans, 2009).
8 Collins' criticism relates the lack of in-depth engagement with the special
character of science in science studies to the disciplinary trajectory of the latter:
while the first half of the 20th century adhered to an inadequate ideal of the
rationalist scientists in logical positivism, “[s]ince the 1960s, certain academic
groups have been effectively trying to turn us all into default experts by showing
that there is nothing special about science” (Collins & Evans, 2009, 19).
come able to adequately situate the scientific content in a debate. And
key to an adequate understanding of empirical success in the olfac-
tory debate was indeed the qualification of said content alongside with
the disciplinary and experimental progression of specialist science.
Non-trivially, scientifically relevant content can involve more than
what is being published in journals. In effect, a correct assessment of
scientific developments and choices also requires a sufficient under-
standing of what is not known, sometimes only anticipated, but not yet
published at a certain time. Such “silent knowledge,” as we called it
above, is integral to the dynamics of a scientific field. Not everything
driving a scientific debate is published, or will ever end up being pub-
lished, but it can fundamentally influence ongoing decision-making.
Scientists themselves are increasibly aware of the impact these hidden
dynamics can have on their research. Recent debates about topics such
as reproducibility and negative results bear testimony to this trend.
Philosophical work as interactional expertise can play a complemen-
tary role in this context (Chang 2006). More than observation, such
complementary performance requires active participation in order to
explicate, situate and analyze the dynamics that instruct the epistemic
landscape of a field. In light of this, a rethinking of philosophical nar-
ratives in relation to scientific practice is important both for descrip-
tive and normative purposes.9
What are the concrete epistemic implications of such philosophical
"explication work" (a term adopted from Schickore 2018)? Notably it
already indicates an broader understanding of successful scientific ob-
servation. Constitutive of its advancement, science does not just col-
lect knowledge in the form of facts, data, instrumental expertise, etc.
It uses these facts to develop more sophisticated questions about the
things that we do not know – a kind of higher form of ignorance, if
you will (for a scientist's view on the positive heuristics of “ignorance”
see Firestein, 2012). Empirical success in an ongoing scientific debate
is not only defined by a collection of experimental proofs and facts
in favor of a model or hypothesis, as is suggested in rational recon-
structions of theory-choice. Moving beyond the context of justifica-
tion, empirical success in scientific practice is characterized by what
certain experiments indicate and promise as potential avenues for fur-
ther work.
In effect, empirical success in science is always also interactional
success. It is about opening up empirical findings to be integrated with
other experimental studies, and to allow for further engagement with
their associated theoretical implications.10 Case in point, Turin's lack
of engagement with the current systems of practice in olfaction adds
to his studies not being taken up by other researchers. (This might
of course change with future studies that would integrate vibrational
approaches alongside ongoing research in olfaction, thereby open-
ing up further avenues for experimental engagement.) Conversely,
the receptor discovery by Buck and Axel (1991) is a prime exam-
ple of the notion of empirical success advanced here. This dis
9 This consideration might also prove useful for currently growing philosophical
interest in the use of case studies in the history and philosophy of science (in
particular, see Kinzel, 2015 paper “Narrative and evidence. How can case studies
from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?”) as well
as recent interest in the construction of narratives in science (see the special issue
by Morgan & Wise, 2017).
10 Moreover, if we apply this definition to historical examples we can see this
revised understanding of empirical success playing out as well. Chang's analysis
of the chemical revolution as a plea for pluralism (2012) was conditional upon
showing that research on phlogiston did not stop engaging with ongoing systems
of practice, and therefore did not lose empirical significance. Proponents of
phlogiston continued to produce ideas and observations that were taken up by
proponents of Lavoisier's system, often to enhance their own understanding and
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covery embedded olfaction into the wider experimental context of
neurobiology by establishing its molecular ties with other cell mem-
brane proteins.
Therefore, the real question we must ask is: Why has so little at-
tention been paid to the impact of the receptors in this popularized
narrative of the olfactory controversy? Given that the receptor discov-
ery got awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize (thirteen years after the orig-
inal breakthrough), it was not a lack of visibility of this key event
that may have distorted epistemic access to the underlying dynam-
ics of the olfactory community. And the receptor discovery is indeed
the first thing olfactory scientists mention when questioned about the
lack of reception regarding the Turin model today. Upon meeting the
olfactory neuroscientist Stuart Firestein in January 2014 I had asked
him: “What if Turin had made his prediction before the discovery of
the olfactory receptors? Would it have changed the evaluation of his
model?” I remember him thinking about my question, and then say-
ing: “It would have given his model a little more time, perhaps. But I
cannot see how it could have survived for too long after the receptor
discovery and its implications in any case.”11
So what constituted the deep impact of this receptor discovery, and
why had it been missed in public and philosophical assessments of
the quantum nose narrative? Fundamentally, the chief mistake in these
discussions of an olfactory pseudo-controversy was to construct the
two experimental contexts, traditional research on smell in analytic
chemistry and new insights from molecular biology, as taking part of
the same historical trajectory of experimental research. However, the
hereby insinuated continuity in theorizing never existed. Instead, it
constituted an artifact of a post hoc reconstruction from the philosoph-
ical narrative of confrontational model-choice.
Without doubt the receptor discovery transformed the field of ol-
faction by modifying scientific explanations of structure-odor rela-
tions in fragrance chemistry. But it would be misleading to reduce this
shift to a mere change regarding the accommodation of chemical data
in the trajectory of smell research. The significance of the receptor dis-
covery was its interactional success in terms of its prospective value.
It essentially opened up research in olfaction to a variety of new ex-
perimental possibilities and embedded it within broader advances in
neurobiology (Buck 2005).
For this, we must revisit the receptor discovery in its full context:
Buck and Axel’s (1991) findings were constitutive of olfaction as a
modern molecular site because they occurred at a time when GPCRs
were just turning into a major topic in biology. For example, the se-
quences of another family of GPCRs, the β-adrenergic receptors, had
just been isolated and established after being a subject of heavy de-
bate and doubted in their existence deep into the 1970s and even
1980s (Barwich & Bschir, 2017; Lefkowitz, 2013). So instead of re-
inforcing a conservative paradigm that had been in place for 30 years
or more – as it was presented in the narratives of Turin, Burr, and
Solomon – the receptor discovery embodied a new scientific outlook
for research on olfaction with little experimental ties to the context of
SORs in analytic chemistry (from which the vibration theorists were
drawing support). Moreover, the sheer force with which this discov-
ery arrived on the scene was rendered visible far beyond the hitherto
small olfactory research community. Notably GPCRs were a consid-
erably young entry in the molecular inventory of biochemistry, with
only the family ties between rhodopsin and the adrenergic receptors
having been published in the late 1980s. Insights into the olfactory
receptors, revealing themselves to be the largest protein gene fam-
ily in the mammalian genome, thus also changed the experimental as
well as theoretical outlook of general studies on GPCR, catapulting
11 Firestein, personal communication 2014.
the olfactory pathway into core neurobiology and marking its proac-
tive value.
By now it should be clear that there never was a genuine scien-
tific controversy in olfaction as painted in public and philosophical
discourse. Thus, let us conclude with the roots of such dissonance be-
tween the public perception and the practitioners' discourse. Overall
the misrepresentation of the scientific context, as unraveled in this arti-
cle, rests on a very general programmatic commitment that also brings
us back to our central concern about a reevaluation of empirical suc-
cess in ongoing science; the commitment to confrontational models
in theoretical comparisons. Philosophical reconstructions of rational
choice scenarios in science has had a long tradition; consider Kuhn-
ian paradigm changes, competition between progressive and degener-
ating research programmes in Lakatos, or Laudan's idea of scientific
advancement by successive theories as better puzzle solvers than pre-
vious ones. Solomon (2001) explicitly situated herself in this tradition
of modeling rational choices between competing research programs;
and her outline of the olfactory controversy in particular rested on a
comparison between the conservative or paradigmatic model and its
rival contender.
But if we want to account for developments in ongoing science, we
are strongly cautioned to abandon this persistent confrontational narra-
tive of Kuhnian paradigms and its philosophical successors in dissent
analysis.12 The problem with paradigms and comparative notions is
that they were developed as primarily historical tools for the post hoc
organization of research developments, positioning alternative ideas
as being in competition. However, when dealing with the changeable
dynamics in current science, such tools can fail considerably to ac-
count for important discontinuities and the occasional absence of a
strictly programmatic model that frequently mark significant changes
in how to position and assess empirical successes in an experimental
system. For example, contemporary receptor studies do not rely on a
univocal paradigm, as the whole straw-man narrative of shape versus
vibration suggests. Rather, inquiry into the ligand binding behavior of
the olfactory receptors oscillates between assumptions of induced fit,
selected fit, or flexible combinations of both (for a detailed review of
these mechanisms see Barwich, 2015b). Further, the details of recep-
tor-ligand binding in olfaction invite new insights to this day (Poivet
et al. 2018). One should not take such open-endedness of current in-
quiry into odorant binding for a lack of modeling success. Having no
fixed or stable model is the very characteristic of unresolved and for-
ward moving inquiry, not its flaw. Moreover, this instability and am-
biguity of contemporary developments does not make assessments of
current experimental data arbitrary or lacking a guideline to evaluate
their success.
Without this organizational narrative of model competition in on-
going science and its flexible modeling perspective, where does this
leave us for our philosophical understanding of the criteria for em-
pirical success? As we saw with our analysis of the olfactory con-
troversy, the general categories of empirical success we applied ear-
lier – data accommodation, instrumental reliability, and predictive
power – do provide useful tools by which to analyze scientific trends
and developments. Still, it is important that their particular instantia-
tions are judged and constantly reevaluated against the requirements
of the empirical context in question. Central to the misrepresentation
of the olfactory debate was a lacking measure concerning the qualifi-
cation of empirical data and its relevance in light of changing discipli-
nary objectives in ongoing science. Empirical success has traditionally
12 Even for historical cases it is not uncontested whether Kuhnian paradigms
provide us with an accurate account of events, as Hasok Chang (2010)
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been framed as being a measure for or against a theory. But without
such fixed theoretical anchor, or an unambiguous theoretical frame-
work, we must conceive of the measures for empirical success differ-
ently.
In summary, such measures of qualification, as we have seen, in-
volved: (1) the changing evidential status of data production methods
(e.g., psychophysical studies had greater impact at the time of Amoore
compared to today); (2) the historically changing relations of data sets
to theoretical explanations (irregular SORs); (3) the network strength
of data sets (the vibrational model only presents successes in relation
to its own framework but does not carry strong impact for general re-
search about receptor behavior); and (4) the temporary fit of an expla-
nation with insights into the empirical characteristics of a target sys-
tem (e.g., lack of protein data in the vibration theory).
5. Conclusion
How must we situate the observational relevance of empirical suc-
cess in terms of changeable decision vectors? We suggest approach-
ing the dynamics in ongoing science similar to how the practition-
ers deal with it; namely, by identifying the open empirical questions
and prospective value of available experimental implementations to
see how they shape current developments. In particular, this can be
achieved by combining two factors. The first factor concerns the con-
text of epistemic appraisal. We saw that observational relevance is de-
termined by an interactional network of methods. Instead of account-
ing for individual experiments via categorical pros and cons as ac-
cumulative vectors in a competitive decision-vector framing, we may
want to reconsider empirical evidence as weighted by its inherent net-
work character. For example, to what extent does an observational
result strengthen or weaken the current connections between two or
more other models and experimental contexts at a certain time (and
under which disciplinary premise)? Or to what degree does an obser-
vation integrate previously neutral evidence? Here, we need to be sen-
sitive to the temporal dynamics, in particular, when these interactions
shift focus from one group of problem explanations to another.
This way of framing offers a multi-dimensional grid in which em-
pirical evidence is scaled in parallel with other developments. Instead
of stipulating scientific rationality to designate a somewhat ahistori-
cal calculation of evidence in relation to competing models, empir-
ical success becomes a moving target that is defined by an inherent
network that ties various strands of research to an empirical prob-
lem. What determines the dynamics of this network model of scien-
tific decision-making in ongoing science? In this context, the second
factor we suggest considering involves heuristic appraisal. Heuristic
appraisal outlines the potential fertility of future work on a scientific
problem and thus concerns the assessment of the prospective values in
experimental strategies (Nickles, 2006, 2009). In the case of the olfac-
tory controversy we saw indeed that observations count as empirically
successful when they are “proactive” in the sense that they open up
further avenues of inquiry instead of merely being supportive of a past
or current framework (the success of the receptor discovery was not
a confirmation of a modeling hypothesis regarding the mechanism of
odor detection; rather, it opened new doors about what odor detection
actually is and, most importantly, integrated olfaction into the broader
context of sensory neuroscience).
Thus, when engaging with current science, philosophical analysis
needs to be sensitive to the origins of the objectives in ongoing sci-
ence before aiming to provide a critical understanding of scientific de-
cision-making. Current science advances fast. It is in a state of con-
stant flux and development, resulting in changeable conceptual narra
tives. It matters that philosophers of science disentangle the different
threads of modeling, and identify the context of the historically sub-
stantiated explanations. Only then can we analyze whether scientific
hypotheses have remained stable over time or entailed a new modeling
approach instead, and invest greater care in understanding the reasons
for their respective successes. Science, in this sense, acts not only as
the subject of science studies but also their corrective.
-
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